The Efficiency of Bureaucracy the public sector, Do it relatable? by Aamir Majeed

Max Weber, a German scientist, defines bureaucracy as a highly structured, formalized, and also impersonal organization. He also instituted the belief that an organization must have a defined hierarchical structure and clear rules, regulations, and lines of authority which govern it.

Bureaucracy disbands the most proficient and balanced way human activity can be organized and that systematic processes and prearranged chain of command are necessary to maintain order, to make the best use of efficiency, and to jettison favoritism.

In a developing country, what is the primary function of bureaucracy? The answer could vary depending on the culture of a society, its level of socioeconomic development, and the nature of its political system. In a traditional sense, in most political systems, bureaucracy has been expected to ensure continuity of policies, political order/stability, uphold rule of law, promote economic development, and cultural cohesion. These traditional functions have been forcefully defended by the proponents of bureaucracy. If one were to look at the performance of bureaucracy in the Third World the results are mixed. In most countries of South Asia, the authority and social elite status of bureaucracy are still recognized; despite the erosion of power and politicization. Its major failure is in its inability to promote welfare, development, equity, and provide justice to the citizens.

Pakistan had a small bureaucracy at the time of independence. However, in the past five decades, it has grown and expanded and become a fairly large and amorphous lot. The federal government employs over 5 lakh, civil servants. Out of this 90 percent are between Grade 1–15, while 10 percent are in Grades 16–22. Of these, the CSS officers comprise around 5 percent. The focus of attention and analysis in this section are these powerful privileged and prestigious elites. In the past five decades, the structure of civil services has undergone an enormous transformation. If one were to take the socioeconomic status (SES) and education as two variables, those who joined the civil services during the decade of 1950 to 1960s, almost 70 percent came from the middle class, about 25 percent belonged to the upper class, while those from the lower middle class were around 5 percent. About 60 to 65 percent had done M.A./M.Sc and 40 to 45 percent were simple B.A/B.Sc. The average age of a new entrant to the service was 22-23 years [Ahmad (1964) and Braibanti (1966)]. Has this profile undergone any change? Statistics for the decade 1987–97 reveal that almost 88 percent describe themselves as belonging to the middle class, while 4 percent belong to the upper class, and 8 percent to the lower

Saeed Shafqat 1000

class. About 75 percent have M.A/M.Sc degrees (including 20 to 30 percent doctors and engineers) the percentage of simple graduates has declined to about 25 percent.

Furthermore, a substantial number joining the Civil Services hail from the urban middle classes. The Common Training Programme (CTP) data indicates that from the 1st CTP to 22nd CTP (1973–1995) a total of 3,374 officers joined the twelve federal services of Pakistan. Among these, the most prominent are the children of the government servants (900) (i.e. sons/daughters of a clerk to a high ranking officer) the second largest group is that of the offsprings of professionals (515) (Doctors, Engineers, Lawyers), followed by Agriculturalist/landlords (514) and businessmen (406). The number of children of the Civil Servants (i.e. CSS Officers) is (167) and that of Defence Forces Officers (165). Collectively constitute about 10 percent of the total CSS services. It is a myth that civil servants and their progenies have a monopoly in the services as some newspaper reports tend to convey. The data clearly demonstrates that since the children of the government servants, professionals, business groups, agriculturists/ landlords, civil servants, and defense officers have better access to the education they take and qualify the examination in larger numbers, therefore their dominance is visible. It is again understandable that as compared to other social groups, since these groups are more knowledgeable about patterns of authority and status associated with various groups (i.e. DMG, Police, Customs, Income Tax), therefore in identifying their service/group preference they are better informed at the time of going through the CSS examination process. Occasionally, despite attaining higher merit in the examination, a candidate ends up in a service that does not correspond with his/her merit position. This happens because of a lack of information about the rankings of various services/groups in the structure of the government. In this sense the sons/daughters of civil servants have a definite advantage; they chose and join services and groups that enjoy power, authority, and elite status. Therefore upon joining the service, despite being smaller in number they are more visible. This happens because of two reasons. First, their parents may have held a prominent appointment as civil servants. Second, in our society where status is determined by lineage, achievement is downplayed. This is newsworthy and promotes a public image that parental connections compromised merit.

Changing socioeconomic profile and attitude formulation among the federal bureaucrats we can conclude that despite limitations, the elite status and staying power of the bureaucracy is generally recognised, this is particularly more pronounced in Pakistan. Here again like most of the Third World states signs of erosion are visible. Bureaucratic institutions are certainly in a disarray if not in decline. There are two options available: first, a radical restructuring of the existing bureaucratic order. Secondly, a piece-meal but holistic reform of the existing bureaucratic institutions. In this paper, I have opted for the second option, and provided guide lines for a piece-meal reform in a broad set of areas. An effort has been made to analyse the framework of bureaucratic order and identify areas where reform is urgently needed. To arrest the process of decay in the bureaucratic institutions and to make a turnaround, a partnership among professionals, bureaucrats and academia is a desirable goal for building an environment and framework for reform. Secondly, to bring about an attitudinal change and improve the skills of civil servants, strengthening of training institutions is a must. Thirdly, devolution of power in the districts and redefining the power structure of the federal secretariat is essential. Fourthly, the salary package for the civil servant is out of tune with financial realities, it needs a drastic revision, if we aim to reduce corruption, injustice and improve the efficiency of the public servant. Fifth, most importantly, political leadership and bureaucracy need to develop a transparent and effective partnership for promoting public interest and ensuring humane governance. An adversarial relationship between the two or an interlocking to protect the vested interest of privileged groups only, would mar the growth of robust institutions, undermine effective governance and consolidation of democracy. Finally it must be understood and appreciated that civil service is a profession where one is expected to work for the welfare of the fellow citizens, it is not simply managerial professionalism, it has a ethical and human dimension—welfare of the fellow citizens.